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Abstract
This paper explores a new type of congestion pricing that diﬀerentiates users with respect to their travel characteristics
or attributes, and charges them diﬀerent amounts of toll accordingly. The scheme can reduce the ﬁnancial burden
of travelers or lead to more substantial reduction of congestion. Given that the scheme requires tracking vehicles,
an incentive program is designed to mitigate travelers’ privacy concerns and entice them to voluntarily disclose their
location information.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Delft University
of Technology
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1. Introduction
Price discrimination or diﬀerentiation is an economic concept deﬁned by Dupuit [1] as a situation
where identical products are sold for diﬀerent prices [2]. Pigou [3] later classiﬁed price discrimination
into three categories. First-degree price discrimination is the case where everyone pays his or her maximum
willingness-to-pay for the product. If the unit price of the product depends on the number of units being
purchased, it is classiﬁed as second degree. Lastly, third-degree discrimination means that the price of one
unit of the product can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent type of users.
Price discrimination is not uncommon in the transportation market. A good example for second-degree
discrimination is transit fare, when, e.g., a two-way ticket is cheaper than two one-way tickets, or the price
of a daily pass is independent of the number of rides taken by a passenger within one day. Moreover,
some transit agencies diﬀerentiate travelers by age and collect diﬀerent fares for kids, students, adults and
elder people, which is an example of third-degree discrimination. Previous studies have discussed price
discrimination in the context of congestion pricing. Wang et al. [4] and Lawphongpanich and Yin [5]
investigated nonlinear pricing, which is essentially an instance of second-degree discrimination where the
amount of toll depends on, not strictly proportional to, the distance traveled inside a tolling area. A case of
third-degree discrimination is investigated in Holguin-Veras and Cetin[6], which diﬀerentiated users based
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on their vehicle type. Others, e.g., [7; 8; 9; 10], diﬀerentiated users based on their values of travel time. De
Palma and Lindsey [11] compared the eﬀect of toll diﬀerentiation based on the value of time and vehicle
type on welfare. As pointed out by Pigou [3], third-degree price discrimination generally requires an ability
to distinguish diﬀerent customer groups, i.e., there must be some observable attributes associated with each
group, unless the pricing scheme possesses a self-selection mechanism. Given that the value of time is not
directly observable, it is not surprising to ﬁnd little practice of price diﬀerentiation with respect to the value
of time.
This paper discusses another third-degree diﬀerentiated pricing scheme that diﬀerentiates travelers with
respect to their travel characteristics or attributes, i.e., origins, destinations, or paths that they traverse be-
tween their origins and destinations. Although similar schemes may have been implemented in closed
networks, e.g., tolled freeways, to our best knowledge, it has not been explored in an open, urban network
environment for the purpose of congestion mitigation. We note that the advancements of vehicle-tracking
and telecommunication technologies have technically enabled such a price diﬀerentiation.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we use numerical examples to demonstrate the po-
tentials of price diﬀerentiation with respect to origin, origin-destination (OD) pair or path. The examples
show that in a ﬁrst-best network condition where all the links are tollable, diﬀerentiated pricing can substan-
tially reduce travelers’ ﬁnancial burden; in a second-best environment where only some links are tollable, it
helps achieve a lower level of congestion. Second, we formulate optimization models to determine optimal
diﬀerentiated pricing schemes for general networks. Third and more importantly, recognizing that price
diﬀerentiation with respect to travel characteristics may compromise travelers’ location privacy, we propose
an approach of modeling privacy, and then design an incentive program to provide incentives for travelers to
reveal their travel information and voluntarily participate in diﬀerentiated pricing. Such an opt-in program
is designed to create a win-win situation for both travelers and society.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses diﬀerent types of diﬀeren-
tiated pricing and their formulations, and presents numerical examples to make a case for diﬀerentiated
pricing. Section 3 discusses the location privacy issue associated with diﬀerentiated schemes, and proposes
an approach of modeling privacy. Section 4 is dedicated to the development of an incentive program for
diﬀerentiated pricing. Lastly, Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses another way to mitigate travelers’
privacy concerns.
2. Diﬀerentiated Pricing Schemes
Diﬀerentiated pricing schemes we discuss in this paper include origin-speciﬁc, OD-speciﬁc and path-
based. As their names suggest, travelers on the same link will be charged diﬀerently, with respect to their
respective origin, OD pair or path. Intuitively, these schemes are more ﬂexible than traditional anonymous
tolling. Mathematically, they can be viewed as diﬀerent levels of relaxation to anonymous schemes.
To facilitate the presentation, we label the diﬀerentiation level of anonymous pricing as zero, and subse-
quently the levels of diﬀerentiation for origin-speciﬁc, OD-speciﬁc and path-based pricing as one, two and
three, respectively.
2.1. Notation
Let G(N, A) denote a transportation network, where N is the set of nodes and A is the set of directed
links. Index a is used to denote a link, which is also represented by its end nodes i, j ∈ N, i.e., (i, j) = a. For
link a, xa and γa are its aggregate ﬂow and toll, respectively. The latter is expressed in the unit of time for
the sake of simplicity. Let W ⊆ N × N be the set of OD pairs with strictly positive demand, w be the index
of its elements and dw be the demand of OD pair w. For every OD pair w ∈ W, o(w) represents its origin.
The set of all paths connecting OD pair w is denoted by Pw with its elements being indexed by p. A binary
parameter δ represents the link-path incidence, i.e., if link a is on path p, then δap is one; otherwise zero.
For every path p, fp and πp denote its ﬂow and toll, respectively. Again, the toll is represented in the unit of
time. Also, tp(.) and ta(.) are the travel time for path p and link a, respectively. For second-best pricing, the
set of tollable links is denoted by Ψ, and its complement set Ψ¯ includes all the untollable links.
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2.2. Formulations
As aforementioned, path-based scheme has the highest level of diﬀerentiation, because the origin or
destination of a trip can be easily determined from the path utilized by the trip. Hence, a general path-based
formulation is used in this paper to describe all three diﬀerentiation schemes. Notice that origin-speciﬁc
and OD-speciﬁc pricing are link-based schemes, and thus the toll of each path is the sum of tolls on links
comprising the path. In contrast, path-based tolls are determined for speciﬁc paths.
We ﬁrst discuss a ﬁrst-best network condition where all links are tollable. In such an environment,
even with the lowest level of price diﬀerentiation, i.e., anonymous tolling, congestion pricing is able to
induce system optimum and replicate system optimum link ﬂows (e.g., [12; 13]). Consequently, the beneﬁt
of price diﬀerentiation can only be reﬂected on a secondary objective. In this paper, we choose revenue
minimization as the secondary objective because it represents a ﬁnancial burden to the traveling public.
Below, we formulate a program for ﬁnding a ﬁrst-best path-based pricing scheme to minimize the total toll
revenue:
min
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
πp fp (1)
s.t. ∑
p∈Pw
fp = dw ∀w ∈ W (2)
fp
(
tp ( f ) + πp − λw
)
= 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (3)
tp ( f ) + πp − λw ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (4)
fp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (5)
πp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (6)∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
δap fp = x¯a ∀a ∈ A (7)
where x¯a is the system optimum link ﬂow on link a. In the above, the objective function is to minimize total
toll revenue. Constraint (2) is to ensure ﬂow conservation; Constraints (3) and (4) are tolled user equilibrium
conditions; Constraints (5) and (6) specify non-negative path ﬂow and toll, and the last constraint requires
link ﬂows to replicate system optimum link ﬂows.
The above formulation can be easily modiﬁed for the other two diﬀerentiated schemes. In origin-speciﬁc
and OD-speciﬁc schemes, tolls are imposed on links, but can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent origins or OD pairs.
In our formulation, we associate a superscript to toll variables, γ, to diﬀerentiate tolls. Subsequently, adding
the following constraints to the above model yields a formulation for origin-speciﬁc pricing:
πp =
∑
a∈A
δapγ
o(w)
a ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (8)
γo(w)a ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,w ∈ W (9)
where γo(w)a is the toll on link a for users from origin o(w).
Similarly, the formulation for OD-speciﬁc pricing can be obtained by adding the following constraints:
πp =
∑
a∈A
δapγ
w
a ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W
γwa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,w ∈ W
where γwa is the toll on link a for users of OD-pair w. It is worth mentioning that Constraint (6) becomes
redundant and can be removed from the formulations for both origin- and OD-speciﬁc schemes.
We now consider a second-best network condition where not all the links are tollable. In this case, anony-
mous tolling may not induce system optimum and thus price diﬀerentiation provides additional ﬂexibility
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to further reduce system travel time. Below we present a formulation to obtain a second-best origin-speciﬁc
pricing scheme that minimizes system travel time:
min
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
tp( f ) fp (10)
s.t.
(2), (3), (4), (5), (8), (9)
γo(w)a = 0 ∀w ∈ W, a ∈ Ψ¯ (11)
The OD-speciﬁc formulation can be developed similarly. Notice that because path-based pricing does not
impose tolls on links, it becomes irrelevant in the second-best network condition, which is considered in this
paper to be the situation where not all links are tollable.
Comparing the above with the ﬁrst-best formulations, Equation (7) is no longer included because system
optimum link ﬂows may not be achievable. In addition, because only speciﬁc links can be tolled, Constraint
(11) is added. We further note that link-based formulations for the origin-speciﬁc and OD-speciﬁc schemes
exist, but we do not present them to keep the paper concise.
Because of Constraints (3)-(5), the formulations presented above all belong to the class of mathemat-
ical programs with complementarity constraints (MPCC). These problems are non-convex and standard
stationary conditions, i.e., KKT conditions, may not hold for them because they do not satisfy Magasarian-
Fromovitz constraint qualiﬁcation [14]. Many solution algorithms have been proposed for MPCC (see, e.g.
[15] and references cited therein). However, some only work well for small and medium problems while
others, especially those based on solving equivalent nonlinear programs (e.g., [16]), can handle larger prob-
lems. More eﬀective algorithms may be developed to solve the above formulations by exploring special
properties or structures that they may possess. For example, Zangui et al. [17] reformulated the ﬁrst-best
path-based pricing problem as a linear integer program that can be solved to global optimality. In this pa-
per, we approximate complementarity constraints to be nonlinear inequality constraints and solve a MPCC
as a nonlinear program [14]. Since the nonlinear program is non-convex, we solve it with multiple initial
solutions and present the best-obtained solution.
2.3. Illustrative Examples
We now demonstrate the potentials of diﬀerentiated pricing schemes on a nine-node network. Figure 1
shows the network with four OD pairs [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], and [2, 4], whose demands are 10, 20, 30 and 40,
respectively. The link performance functions are of the following form:
ta(xa) = Ta
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1 + 0.15
(
xa
ba
)4⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where Ta and ba are provided in Figure 1 as (Ta, ba) near each link.
Table 1. Diﬀerentiated pricing for nine-node network with all links tollable (unit: min)
Tolling Scheme Toll Revenue OD Generalized Travel CostAmount Reduction [1, 3] [1, 4] [2, 3] [2, 4]
User Equilibrium - - 24.9 23.8 24.3 25.1
Anonymous 887.6 0% 30.6 29.2 33.0 31.6
Origin-speciﬁc 311.6 65% 23.4 29.3 25.8 24.4
OD-speciﬁc 295.6 67% 23.4 22.0 25.8 27.6
Path-based 263.6 70% 23.4 22.0 29.0 24.4
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Fig. 1. Nine-node network
Table 1 presents the results1 of diﬀerent levels of diﬀerentiation when all links are tollable. The second
and third columns show the minimum toll revenue of each scheme, and the percent reduction as compared to
the anonymous scheme. It can be observed that the toll revenues for all diﬀerentiated schemes are substan-
tially lower than that of anonymous pricing. Moreover, as the level of diﬀerentiation increases, the revenue
decreases. Particularly, price diﬀerentiation with respect to path yields a 70% reduction in revenue. The
last four columns present the equilibrium travel cost for each OD pair. Observe that other than OD-pair [1,
4] under origin-speciﬁc scheme, the travel costs under diﬀerentiated schemes are less than those under the
anonymous scheme, suggesting that diﬀerentiated pricing may be more appealing to individual travelers in
this network.
Table 2. Second-best diﬀerentiated pricing for nine-node network (unit: min)
Tolling Scheme Total Travel Time OD Generalized Travel CostAmount Saving [1, 3] [1, 4] [2, 3] [2, 4]
User Equilibrium 2455.9 0% 24.9 23.8 24.3 25.1
Anonymous 2361.2 46.9% 25.8 24.9 25.1 25.9
Origin-speciﬁc 2306.1 74.2% 24.3 24.2 27.1 25.7
OD-speciﬁc 2281.7 86.2% 24.4 22.9 26.8 25.3
System Optimum 2253.9 100% - - - -
Table 2 presents the results of solving second-best diﬀerentiated pricing for the nine-node network, when
only links (5,7) and (7,3) are tollable. In this table, the second column shows the total system travel time
under each tolling scheme. Knowing that system optimum yields the smallest system travel time, we present
the third column as the ratio between travel time reduction from user equilibrium and the maximum possible
reduction, i.e., the diﬀerence in travel times of user equilibrium and system optimum. It is evident that price
diﬀerentiation leads to additional travel time reduction. Speciﬁcally, even with only two links being tollable,
the OD-speciﬁc tolling scheme achieves 86.2% of the maximum possible reduction, a reduction achieved
by a ﬁrst-best pricing scheme that may toll all links.
We also solved for diﬀerentiated schemes on the Sioux Falls network from [18] as shown in Figure 2 and
the results are presented in Table 3. For second-best pricing, only the dashed links in Figure 2 are assumed to
be tollable. Table 3 shows that ﬁrst-best diﬀerentiated pricing yields a substantial reduction in toll revenue,
while minimizing system travel time. Similarly, the second-best pricing schemes oﬀer promising results.
Using system optimum as the benchmark, the additional travel time under user equilibrium is 2.859. The
origin-speciﬁc scheme can reduce the additional time to 1.117, which is equivalent to a 60.93% reduction.
Compared to anonymous tolling, origin-speciﬁc tolls can achieve approximately twice travel time reduction.
1Results are the best-obtained ones, but likely local optima. This note applies to other tables in this paper.
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Fig. 2. Sioux Falls network
Table 3. Diﬀerentiated pricing for Sioux Falls network (unit: 103 hrs)
TollingScheme First-best Second-bestMin. Revenue Reduction Travel Time Saving
Anonymous 20.666 0.00% 74.043 26.55%
Origin-speciﬁc 0.750 96.37% 73.060 60.93%
OD-speciﬁc 0.616 97.02% 72.997 63.13%
Path-based 0.182 99.12% - -
User Equilibrium - - 74.802 0.00%
System Optimum - - 71.943 100.00%
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In general, for both the ﬁrst-best and second-best conditions, higher levels of diﬀerentiation lead to more
favorable results. On the other hand, diﬀerentiated pricing schemes are more diﬃcult to implement. One
needs to consider such a trade-oﬀ to determine whether a higher level of diﬀerentiation is worth implement-
ing or not on a particular network.
3. Location Privacy
One of the major reasons for the implementation diﬃculty of diﬀerentiated pricing is potential viola-
tion of motorists’ location privacy. Location privacy is deﬁned as the ability to prevent other parties from
learning one’s current or past location [19]. The issue of location privacy commonly arises when oﬀering a
service requires some sort of location data. The issue has been mostly studied for situations where mobile
applications or computer programs need to know the location of a user (e.g., [20; 21]).
The traditional way of manually collecting toll preserves location privacy almost completely. Needless
to say, it is not an eﬃcient way to collect toll, as vehicles have to stop and pay. Electronic toll collection
(ETC) systems have been built to make toll collection more eﬃcient, but the way they currently operate
may compromise motorists’ privacy rights [22]. The systems often link motorists’ accounts and record
locations and times of transactions (e.g., the Sunpass prepaid toll program in Florida [23]). If toll gantries are
ubiquitous, the recorded transaction information may impinge on the privacy rights of motorists. However,
those who are concerned about their location privacy have the option to pay the toll by cash and avoid risk of
privacy disclosure. Moreover, for anonymous link-based tolling, it is possible to design a privacy-preserving
ETC system (e.g., [24; 25]) .
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to design a privacy-preserving diﬀerentiated pricing sys-
tem, because the system requires the knowledge of travelers’ location information, such as the origin and
destination of each trip for an OD-speciﬁc scheme. Golle and Partridge [26] and Krumm [27] pointed out
that the home/work location data, even if they are anonymous, can be used to identify individuals. In addi-
tion to this, the sole fact of being tracked by the tolling system can cause inconvenience or discomfort. All
these privacy concerns need to be addressed.
On the other hand, there have been some indications that motorists, some at a price, are willing to provide
location information with the understanding that it will not be published and/or misused. For example, in the
Travel Choices Study completed by the Puget Sound Regional Council [28], each participant was given a
$1016 debit account with a GPS-based on-board unit installed on his or her car. This unit tracks and records
when and where the participants drive and deducts tolls from the account. The money remaining in each
account at the end of the study was given to the study participant. In this example, location information
was collected for the purpose of tolling and with full knowledge of study participants. We surmise that the
participants may be attracted to the $1016 incentive when joining the study.
Empirical experiments in the literature have proved that individuals value their location privacy dif-
ferently. They can be grouped into categories of privacy unconcerneds, privacy pragmatists, and privacy
fundamentalists [27]. The ﬁrst group do not care about location privacy and are insensitive to the negative
consequences of location leak. The second group are willing to reveal their location for a, sometimes very
small, price, while the last group highly value and strive to protect their location privacy. Mathematically,
we can use a distribution to represent diﬀerent individual valuations of privacy across the population. Ac-
quisti et al. [29] suggested a U-shaped distribution, but cautioned that the value of privacy can be very
malleable and many non-normative factors may aﬀect its distribution (also see [20]). Hence, we do not base
our models on any speciﬁc, but a general distribution for the value of privacy. Nevertheless, it is important
to understand the implication of a proposed distribution. For example, although logistic distributions oﬀer
computational advantages as we have seen in the choice modeling, such distributions imply that some users
will have a negative value of privacy, an unjustiﬁable assumption.
Figure 3 illustrates more reasonable uniform and exponential distributions, both with a mean of two.
In this ﬁgure, U(0, 4) denotes a uniform distribution between 0 and 4, and EXP(0.5) is an exponential
distribution with a parameter of 0.5. Notice that the exponential distribution is more clustered around smaller
values, which implies that more users value their privacy less. However, exponential distributions with
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higher mean values become more evenly distributed. Also notice that the span for an exponential distribution
is all nonnegative real numbers, while the uniform distribution is bounded on both sides. So, uniform
distribution implies that the value of privacy of travelers is evenly distributed and has an upper bound. On
the other hand, the exponential distribution suggests that some travelers are extreme privacy fundamentalists
and will not disclose their locations at any price.
θ
ξ(θ)
ξ ∼ EXP(0.5)
0.25
0.50
ξ ∼ U(0, 4)
42
Fig. 3. Uniform and exponential distributions with same mean, E(θ) = 2
3.1. Modeling Privacy
We now use origin-speciﬁc pricing as an example for modeling privacy. Denote the travel cost between
OD pair w under the scheme as λw,1, which consists of travel time and toll. Since they are being tracked,
motorists incur additional cost for the loss of their location privacy, which we call privacy cost. Mathemat-
ically, the full cost for a traveler between OD pair w under origin-speciﬁc pricing is λw,1 + β, where β is a
random variable representing the value of privacy, which is also expressed in the unit of time for simplicity.
In this paper, we assume the distribution of value of privacy is the same for travelers from each OD pair, but
this assumption can be easily relaxed.
Suppose the value of privacy follows a known distribution ξ, i.e., β ∼ ξ. Deﬁne Ξ(θ) = ∫ θ0 ξ(z)dz as the
cumulative distribution function associated with the value of privacy, i.e., Prob(β ≤ θ) = Ξ(θ). Denote the
travel cost between OD pair w under anonymous tolling as λw,0 and let θw = λw,0 − λw,1. If θw is negative,
no individual from this OD pair prefers the origin-speciﬁc scheme. As we observe from Tables 1 and 2, θw
is likely positive. In this case, travelers who value their privacy less than θw would prefer the origin-speciﬁc
scheme to the anonymous one, while those with higher value of privacy would prefer anonymous tolling.
The percentage of the former is Ξ(θw) while it is 1 − Ξ(θw) for the latter. Figure 4 illustrates this situation
for a hypothetical distribution of the value of privacy, where the shaded area represents the percentage of
travelers who will be better oﬀ and thus prefer the origin-speciﬁc scheme. Their total privacy cost, denoted
as PCw(θw), can be computed as follows: PCw(θw) =
∫ θw
0 dwξ(z)zdz, where dw is the total demand between
OD pair w. Deﬁne E(β; θw) =
∫ θw
0 zξ(z)dz, and the equation is thus written as PCw(θw) = dwE(β; θw).
The calculations of Ξ(θ) and E(β; θ) involve integration. If the value of privacy follows a uniform or an
exponential distribution, the integrals will have a closed form. In a general case where the integrals do not
have a closed form, we need to compute them via numerical integration methods, such as Riemann sum as
follows:
Ξ(θ) =
∫ θ
0
ξ(z)dz =
1
n
θ
n∑
i=1
ξ(
iθ
n
)
E(β; θ) =
∫ θ
0
zξ(z)dz =
1
n
θ
n∑
i=1
( iθw
n
ξ(
iθ
n
)
)
where n is the number of bars used to approximate the area. Choosing a larger n would result in a higher
precision.
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θwE(β; θw)
θ
ξ(θ)
Fig. 4. Expected privacy cost
3.2. Privacy Analysis of Diﬀerentiated Schemes
In this section, we examine the results of the nine-node network in Section 2.3 from a privacy perspec-
tive. Table 4 calculates the percentages of travelers between each OD pair who would beneﬁt from origin-
speciﬁc pricing after considering privacy cost, i.e., 100Ξ(θw) , under diﬀerent hypothetical distributions for
the value of privacy.
Table 4. Percentage of travelers who beneﬁt from origin-speciﬁc pricing on nine-node network
Network Condition First-best Second-best
OD pair [1,3] [1,4] [2,3] [2,4] [1,3] [1,4] [2,3] [2,4]
Travel Cost Saving 7.2 -0.1 7.2 7.2 1.5 0.7 -2.0 0.2
β ∼ U(0, 4) 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 37.50 17.50 0.00 5.00
β ∼ U(0, 8) 90.00 0.00 90.00 90.00 18.75 8.75 0.00 2.50
β ∼ U(0, 16) 45.00 0.00 45.00 45.00 9.37 4.38 0.00 1.25
β ∼ EXP(0.500) 97.27 0.00 97.27 97.27 52.76 29.53 0.00 9.52
β ∼ EXP(0.250) 83.47 0.00 83.47 83.47 31.27 16.05 0.00 4.88
β ∼ EXP(0.125) 59.34 0.00 59.34 59.34 17.10 8.38 0.00 2.47
The third row of Table 4 shows the saving of time and toll for travelers between each OD pair, i.e. θw =
λw,0 − λw,1. It can be observed that, even if the average value of privacy is high, some travelers still beneﬁt
from diﬀerentiated schemes. However, the percentage decreases as the average value of privacy increases.
Also observe that when travel cost saving is small, exponential distributions predict higher percentages of
users who will beneﬁt from diﬀerentiated schemes, because the distributions are more clustered around
smaller values.
Apparently, the savings of time and toll that some travelers enjoy from diﬀerentiated schemes are oﬀset
by the loss of their privacy. Section 4 presents a way to take advantage of the potentials of diﬀerentiated
pricing, while allowing those concerned travelers to maintain their privacy.
4. Addressing Privacy Concerns with an Incentive Program
Recognizing that somemay beneﬁt from diﬀerentiated schemes while others with higher value of privacy
may be better oﬀ under anonymous tolling, we propose to develop an incentive program for travelers to opt
in to diﬀerentiated pricing. More speciﬁcally, a hybrid of anonymous and diﬀerentiated pricing schemes
will be implemented on the network. Travelers who choose to reveal their location information will pay
diﬀerentiated tolls while those who do not disclose their information pay anonymous tolls.
Since travel costs (time plus toll) in diﬀerentiated schemes are generally less than those in the anonymous
scheme, the cost savings can be viewed as incentives for drivers to participate in diﬀerentiated pricing.
Although other incentives, such as subsidies or credits, can be provided, below we focus on designing
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anonymous and diﬀerentiated tolls in the hybrid scheme and allowing for the cost savings as incentives. The
overall goal of this hybrid scheme is to create a win-win situation for both users and society.
4.1. Design of Incentive Program
As an example, we design the incentive program for a hybrid of origin-speciﬁc and anonymous tolls. The
formulations for other hybrid schemes can be developed with some straightforward modiﬁcations. Hence,
we do not present them to keep the paper concise.
It is reasonable to assume all the motorists who are better oﬀ under an origin-speciﬁc scheme will opt in
to this scheme. Thus, the number of these motorists will be dw,1 = Ξ(λw,0 − λw,1)dw. Travelers who choose
the anonymous scheme will not incur any privacy cost. Hence, the total privacy cost for travelers between
OD pair w is equal to PCw(λw,0 − λw,1), as deﬁned in Section 3.1.
The following constraints deﬁne the feasible region of the problem:
dw,0 + dw,1 = dw ∀w ∈ W (12)
dw,1 = Ξ(λw,0 − λw,1)dw ∀w ∈ W (13)∑
p∈Pw
fp,c = dw,c ∀w ∈ W, c ∈ C (14)
fp,c
(
tp ( f ) + πp,c − λw,c
)
= 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W, c ∈ C (15)
tp ( f ) + πp,c − λw,c ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W, c ∈ C (16)
λw,0 ≥ λw,1 ∀w ∈ W (17)
fp,c ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W, c ∈ C (18)
πp,c ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W, c ∈ C (19)
πp,0 =
∑
a∈A
δapγa ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (20)
γa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A (21)
πp,1 =
∑
a∈A
δapγ
o(w)
a ∀p ∈ Pw,w ∈ W (22)
γo(w)a ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,w ∈ W (23)
where C = {0, 1}. Constraints (12) and (13) split the demand for each OD pair. Constraint (14) ensures ﬂow
balance. The tolled user equilibrium is guaranteed by Constraints (15) and (16). Constraint (17) requires
travel cost (time plus toll) in the origin-speciﬁc scheme to be less than that in the anonymous scheme.
Constraints (20) and (22) make the toll on each path to be equal to the sum of link tolls. Denote the feasible
region deﬁned by the above constraints as Φ.
We ﬁrst discuss the problem of ﬁnding the optimal hybrid scheme in the ﬁrst-best network setting where
all the links are tollable. In this situation, we are interested in replicating the ﬂow distribution with minimum
system travel time, i.e., x¯, as well as minimizing the user cost as a secondary objective. The following is the
total (full) user cost:
∑
w∈W
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝PCw(λw,0 − λw,1) +
∑
p∈Pw
(
πp,0 fp,0 + πp,1 fp,1
)⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ +
∑
a∈A
xata(xa)
Since x = x¯ ought to be achieved in ﬁrst-best pricing, the last term is a constant and can be omitted from the
optimization. Consequently, we have the following formulation for ﬁnding an optimal hybrid scheme in a
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network with all links being tollable:
min
∑
w∈W
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝PCw(λw,0 − λw,1) +
∑
p∈Pw
(
πp,0 fp,0 + πp,1 fp,1
)⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (24)
s.t.
( f , d, π, λ) ∈ Φ∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
δa,p
(
fp,0 + fp,1
)
= x¯a ∀a ∈ A
where the last constraint is to ensure the link ﬂows to be the least-system-time ﬂows.
We now consider a second-best situation when only some links are tollable. In this situation, we attempt
to minimize total system cost, which diﬀers from the above total (full) user cost by the toll revenue, because
the revenue is not a cost for the system but a transfer from travelers to the government. The problem of
ﬁnding an optimal hybrid scheme can be formulated as follows:
min
∑
w∈W
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝PCw(λw,0 − λw,1) +
∑
p∈Pw
tp( f ) fp
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (25)
s.t.
( f , d, π, λ) ∈ Φ
γo(w)a = 0 ∀w ∈ W, a ∈ Ψ¯
The last constraint ensures that only tollable links can have positive amount of toll.
Notice that the above formulations are path-based, and solving them requires path enumeration. How-
ever, it is possible to formulate them as link-based models. We use the above path-based formulations to
facilitate the presentation.
4.2. Numerical Examples
The proposed models for designing the incentive program of the origin-speciﬁc scheme were imple-
mented on the nine-node and Sioux Falls networks. Each model was solved for both uniform and exponen-
tial distributions of value of privacy, each with three diﬀerent expected values.
Table 5 presents the results on the nine-node network of Figure 1 with all the links being tollable. The
performances of the hybrid schemes are also compared with those of the anonymous and origin-speciﬁc
tolls when implemented separately.
Table 5. Comparison of diﬀerent schemes on nine-node network (all links tollable. Unit: min)
Pricing Scheme
Distribution
of β E(β) Toll Revenue Privacy Cost Total User Cost
Anonymous - - 887.60 0.00 887.60
Origin-speciﬁc
- 2 311.60 200.00 511.60
- 4 311.60 400.00 711.60
- 8 311.60 800.00 1111.60
Hybrid
U(0, 4) 2 247.82 28.46 276.28
U(0, 8) 4 235.25 58.47 293.72
U(0, 16) 8 218.10 113.92 332.02
EXP(0.500) 2 249.84 17.49 267.33
EXP(0.250) 4 236.16 34.57 270.73
EXP(0.125) 8 210.59 69.16 279.75
As pointed out previously, origin-speciﬁc pricing can reduce the toll revenue signiﬁcantly in a ﬁrst-
best network condition. However, this reduction comes with a price of violating travelers’ privacy. Since
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origin-speciﬁc schemes require all the users to reveal their origin information, the privacy cost is equal to
the expected value of privacy multiplying by the total demand. The privacy cost increases as travelers value
their privacy more, eventually causing the total user cost under origin-speciﬁc pricing to be larger than that
under anonymous tolling, when the expected value of privacy is equal to 8. In contrast, the hybrid scheme
oﬀers an option for travelers of high value of privacy to remain anonymous. Such a self-selection mechanism
leads to much smaller loss of privacy and subsequently less total user cost. Interestingly, in this example,
the hybrid schemes also lead to less amount of toll revenue than their origin-speciﬁc counterparts. However,
this observation need not be generally true.
Table 6. Comparison of diﬀerent schemes on nine-node network (two tollable links. Unit: min)
Pricing Scheme
Distribution
of β E(β) Travel Time Privacy Cost Total System Cost
Anonymous - - 2361.16 0.00 2361.16
Origin-speciﬁc
- 2 2306.10 200.00 2506.10
- 4 2306.10 400.00 2706.10
- 8 2306.10 800.00 3106.10
Hybrid
U(0, 4) 2 2291.79 9.13 2300.92
U(0, 8) 4 2296.76 13.08 2309.84
U(0, 16) 8 2304.63 17.57 2322.20
EXP(0.500) 2 2291.45 5.82 2297.27
EXP(0.250) 4 2293.47 9.56 2303.04
EXP(0.125) 8 2299.10 13.30 2312.40
We solved for the anonymous, origin-speciﬁc and hybrid schemes on the nine-node network when only
two speciﬁc links, (5,7) and (7,3), are tollable. Table 6 displays the results for each scheme. As expected,
in every case, the total cost under the hybrid scheme is less than those in the anonymous and origin-speciﬁc
schemes. Interestingly, the hybrid schemes also yield even less total travel time than the origin-speciﬁc
scheme, even though the latter is to minimize total travel time. As the feasible regions of these two models
are not the same, one should not expect that the origin-speciﬁc problem always yields less total travel time
than the hybrid counterpart. Because the hybrid scheme problem is to minimize the total system cost that
includes total travel time as one component, and any feasible solution to the origin-speciﬁc problem can be
obtained from the hybrid scheme problem by setting anonymous tolls to be suﬃciently high, it can happen
that the hybrid scheme problem yields less total travel time.
Table 7. Second-best hybrid schemes on Sioux Falls network
Pricing Scheme
Distribution
of β
E(β)
(hr)
Travel Time
(103 hrs)
Privacy Cost
(103 hrs)
Total System Cost
(103 hrs)
Anonymous - - 74.043 0.000 74.043
Origin-speciﬁc
- 0.02 73.060 7.212 80.272
- 0.04 73.060 14.424 87.474
- 0.08 73.060 28.848 101.908
Hybrid
U(0, 0.04) 0.02 73.294 0.118 73.412
U(0, 0.08) 0.04 73.421 0.138 73.421
U(0, 0.16) 0.08 73.591 0.163 73.753
EXP(50.0) 0.02 73.272 0.086 73.357
EXP(25.0) 0.04 73.355 0.106 73.461
EXP(12.5) 0.08 73.455 0.163 73.618
To demonstrate the models on a more realistic network, we solved them on the Sioux Falls network
where the tollable links are the dashed ones in Figure 2. The obtained results are presented in Table 7.
Similar to the nine-node network, the privacy cost and total cost increase as the expected value of privacy
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Fig. 5. An illustrative network
increases. Also, the privacy cost and total cost under the exponential distributions is less than those associ-
ated with the uniform distributions.
The results in this section illustrate the potentials of the incentive program for origin-speciﬁc pricing.
For two extreme cases, with the value of privacy being zero or inﬁnity, the hybrid scheme yields the same
results as diﬀerentiated or anonymous scheme, respectively. But, in the real world, this value should be ﬁnite
and positive. Our results indicate that the performance of the incentive program is much better when the
expected value of privacy is relatively low, i.e., more users are willing to reveal their information for a small
amount of money (previous empirical studies seem suggest so). The incentive program also demonstrates
promising results when the expected value of privacy is relatively higher. While this section only focuses on
a hybrid of origin-speciﬁc and anonymous tolls, we expect other hybrids to perform favorably in a similar
fashion.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper has explored a new class of tolling schemes that charge diﬀerent amounts of toll for users with
diﬀerent origins, destinations, or paths. These schemes provide more ﬂexibility than traditional anonymous
pricing and the numerical examples in this paper have demonstrated that they can reduce the ﬁnancial burden
on motorists in a ﬁrst-best network condition or lead to more travel time saving in a second-best condition.
Recognizing that the diﬀerentiated pricing may compromise travelers’ privacy, we have proposed an
incentive program to allow travelers to opt in to the diﬀerentiated pricing, if they ﬁnd the amount of incentive
to be worth disclosing their location information. This self-selection mechanism allows the tolling agency
to take advantages of the potentials of diﬀerentiated pricing without doing harm to travelers’ privacy rights.
Other approaches can be explored to mitigate privacy concerns associated with diﬀerentiated pricing.
For instance, instead of charging users based on their true origins, the tolling agency can designate a tolling
area and then charge users based on where they enter the area. Because the true origins are not revealed,
this scheme may partially mitigate travelers’ privacy concern. Note that this scheme is diﬀerent from the
traditional cordon pricing in which motorists pay a uniform toll to cross the cordon. In the reﬁned scheme,
motorists on a link within the tolling area will pay diﬀerent amounts of toll depending on where they enter
the tolling area. We call this scheme as a sub-network origin-speciﬁc pricing scheme. To illustrate the
concept, consider the network in Figure 5 where the tolling area consists of the dashed links. Consider three
diﬀerent paths, p1 : 2 → 6 → 5 → 7 → 3, p2 : 2 → 1 → 5 → 7 → 3, and p3 : 1 → 5 → 7 → 3.
While in the original origin-speciﬁc scheme, travelers on p1 and p2 will pay the same amount of toll on link
(5,7), they may pay diﬀerent amounts of toll for traversing the link under the reﬁned scheme, because they
enter the tolled sub-network from diﬀerent nodes (Nodes 6 and 5 respectively). Also, unlike in the original
origin-speciﬁc pricing, motorists on p2 and p3 will pay the same amount of toll for link (5,7) because they
both enter the sub-network from Node 5.
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We implemented the sub-network origin-speciﬁc scheme for the Sioux Falls network (Fig. 2), where
the tolling area consists of dashed links and nodes 10, 11, 14, 15, 17 and 19. The best design yields a
system travel time of 73.215, which is slightly greater than the system travel time of 73.060 under the
true origin-speciﬁc scheme. In this case, the reﬁned sub-network origin-speciﬁc pricing is very promising.
An interesting future study can be conducted to explore how to select the tolling area to achieve a similar
performance as the true origin-speciﬁc tolling.
This paper assumes that OD travel demands are ﬁxed. In transportation planning, ﬁxed-demand models
are often used to predict traﬃc ﬂows during morning and evening peak periods because demands during
these periods consist mainly of people commuting to and from work and are typically regarded as inelastic.
However, recent evidence for Singapore, London, and Stockholm shows that travel demand during peak
periods tends to be more elastic than models have predicted. It is thus worthwhile to investigate diﬀerentiated
pricing under elastic demands. Future research can also be performed to explore diﬀerentiated pricing in
dynamic (e.g., [30; 31]) or multimodal (e.g., [32; 33]) settings.
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